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We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities and market competition to
study the choice of the incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivity. Oligopolistic
screening requires extra effort/investment from the most productive managers: under additional
assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no distortion in the middle
rather than at the top. The equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between
(any) two types always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive relation
between competition and high-powered incentives. An inverted U curve between competition
and absolute investments can emerge for the most productive managers.
1. Introduction
Awide literature on contract theory has described how asymmetric information shapes
Q1
Q2
the optimal contracts between a principal and an agent with private information. For
instance, when the agent is the manager of a monopolistic firm and has private infor-
mation on the productivity of effort, the optimal contract requires the first best effort for
the most productive type and a downward distortion of effort for all the less productive
types, with effort differentials associated with wage differentials in a way that insures
incentive compatibility (see Stiglitz, 1977 or Baron and Myerson, 1982). However, when
a firm is not a monopolist, but competes in the market with other firms, we can expect
that the optimal contracts are affected by competition and the competitive prices are
affected by the contracts implemented by all the firms. Although the analysis of equilib-
rium principal–agent contracts has been studied inmodels with perfect competition [see
Rotschild and Stiglitz (1976), ormore recently, Bisin andGottardi (2006) and Pouyet et al.
(2008)], there is limited work for the general case of imperfect competition. The notable
exception of Martimort (1996) examines equilibrium contracts in a duopoly where the
types of managers of the firms are perfectly correlated: this is a reasonable assumption
in the presence of common aggregate shocks, but not in the presence of firm-specific
shocks or asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers. We augment
principal–agent models between firms competing in the market and their managers
We are grateful to Hongbin Cai, Jacques Cremer, Martin Cripps, Jeoren Hinloopen, Eugen Kovac, Daniel
Kra¨hmer, Matthias Kra¨kel, Konrad Mierendorff, Piergiovanna Natale, Patrick Rey, Urs Schweizer, and par-
ticipants at seminars at the Peking University, University of Bonn, University of Amsterdam, and Cresse
conference in Crete for discussions on the topic.
C© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 22, Number 3, Fall 2013, 488–512
jems12021 wiley3g-jems.cls May 18, 2013 22:0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts 489
with idiosyncratic and uncorrelated shocks that give raise to equilibrium contracts that
differ from those offered by a monopolistic firm. The aim is to investigate how entry in
a market affects the equilibrium contracts and, in turn, how these contracts affect the
endogenous market structure.
We consider firms that in a first stage choose contracts for their managers and in
a second stage compete in the market. Each contract provides incentives to undertake
R&D activities that reduce the marginal cost. At the time of competing a` la Cournot in
the last stage, the contracts or the cost-reducing activity become observable in our base-
line model. The interesting interaction occurs at the initial contractual stage between
the firms and their managers. The managers are ex ante homogenous but, after being
matched with a firm, they differ in their productivities, which are identically and inde-
pendently distributed. We consider as a benchmark case the one in which productivities
can be observed by the firm’s owner (but not by the rival), and then we consider the
more realistic situation in which each productivity level is private information to each
manager. The contracts are expressed in terms of effort/wage schedules. Our focus is
on Bayesian Nash competition in contracts: these are chosen simultaneously, taking as
given the contracts offered by the other firms.
The equilibrium principal–agent contracts require extra effort from the most pro-
ductive managers compared to the equilibrium contracts emerging with symmetric
information. This deviation from the traditional property of “no distortion at the top”
emerges because of the strategic interactions between contracts for different types (due
to strategic substitutability between efforts). In particular, the fact that all the competi-
tors commit to distort downward the effort of their inefficient managers increases the
marginal profitability of the effort of an efficient manager (likely to compete with in-
efficient ones), and vice versa. This enhances the polarization of the efforts required
from different managers. Under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the dis-
tribution of types (which must be positive enough) we actually obtain “no distortion
in the middle”: all the best (worst) types exert more (less) effort than under symmetric
information.
Our main result on the relation between competition and incentives is the follow-
ing: the effort differential between (any) two types of managers is always increasing in
the number of firms, which may suggest a positive relation between competition and
high-powered incentive schemes. Loosely speaking, competition enhances meritocracy:
when the number of firms increases, each firm tends to differentiate more its contracts
(i.e., spend relativelymore onwages for the bestmanagers), requiring a relatively higher
effort from an efficient manager because this can lead to larger gains against less effi-
cient rivals. Also the absolute effort levels can increase with the number of firms, but
only for the most efficient managers: moreover, we show that in such a case an inverted
U curve between competition and absolute investment in cost-reducing activities can
emerge.
A wide industrial organization literature, started by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980),
Tandon (1984), and Sutton (1991) and generalized in recent work by Vives (2008), has
studied the impact of competition on deterministic cost-reduction activities, showing
that an increase in the number of homogenous firms tends to reduce production, profits,
and investment of each firm. Our model generalizes this framework with heterogeneity
and uncertainty in firms’ productivity and also asymmetric information between firms’
owners and their managers engaged in the cost-reducing activities. Following the cited
literature, we also consider the case of endogenous market structures, that emphasizes
a positive relation between market size and relative (and possibly absolute) measures of
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effort. In particular, we find that an increase in the size of the market or a reduction in
Q3
the fixed cost amplifies the effort differentials.
Only few works have examined principal–agent contracts in oligopoly. Martin
(1993) has developed a first example of Cournot competition with asymmetric infor-
mation between firms and managers on the cost-reduction technology, confirming the
negative relation between entry and effort due to a scale effect on the profit and the
absolute effort of each firm. The specification adopted led to constant cost targets for
all firms, eliminating any strategic interaction between contracts (see also Bertoletti and
Poletti, 1996).1 Such a focus on the scale effect can be misleading, because the absolute
investment/effort can be a bad measure of the strength of the incentive mechanisms
under different market conditions. A more appropriate measure of this strength is the
effort differential between managers of different types, which represents the divergence
of efforts and compensations (relative to revenues or profits) between employees with
different productivities: we focusmainly on this comparativemeasure and show that the
effort differentials are always increasing in the level of competition. Part of the literature
on contract theory (Ivaldi and Martimort, 1994; Stole, 1995; Martimort, 1996) has ana-
lyzed duopolies engaged in price discrimination, which generates a problem of common
agency that is fundamentally different from our competitive interaction between two
principal–agent hierarchies. Piccolo et al. (2008) have analyzed cost-plus contracts a` la
Laffont and Tirole (1986) in a Cournot duopoly with perfectly correlated shocks, which
excludes any strategic interaction between contracts: the agency problem remains for-
mally equivalent to that of a monopolist. Note that these works emphasize the relation
between product substitutability and managerial incentives,2 while we mainly focus on
the relation between entry of firms in the market and incentives.
We should note that otherworks have identified instances of effort provision above
the first best level for the most productive types in violation of the “no distortion at the
top” convention, but fromdifferent sources such as externalities betweenmultiple agents
(Lockwood, 2000) or learning indynamic environmentswith noisy signals (Jeitschko and
Mirman, 2002). Cella and Etro (2010) analyze a two-types-two-firms environment where
efforts can be either strategic substitutes or complements, competition can take differ-
ent forms (patent races, competition in prices a` la Hotelling, competition in quantities
with complement goods and with investments in advertising), and allow for imperfect
correlation across types. Finally, Piccolo (2011) has adopted a framework similar to ours
to study the role of information sharing between competing vertical hierarchies.
Our results on the positive relation between number of firms and effort differentials
may contribute to explain the weak but positive correlation between competition and
incentive mechanisms found in many empirical studies, for instance in Hubbard and
Palia (1995), Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2005), and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).3 In par-
ticular, our results in case of endogenous entry of firms appear in line with the findings
1. On the relation between incentive contracts and competition see also Hermalin (1994), Schmidt (1997),
and Etro (2011). Schmidt (1997) develops a model of moral hazard where a positive impact of competition
on effort may emerge from a threat of liquidation associated with low effort; however, his model does not
generate any feedback effect of the equilibrium contracts on competition. Here, we are interested in studying
both how competition affects contracts and how contracts affect competition.
2. Piccolo et al. (2008) examine also the case of profit-target contracts, which leads again to equilibria with
the traditional no distortion at the top and a downward distortion on the effort of the inefficient managers: the
interesting aspect is that the effort of the inefficient managers may be nonmonotonic in the degree of product
substitutability.
3. Note that our mechanism works under independent shocks but not in case of common shocks. Empiri-
cally, one could discriminate between the two by looking at cost shocks at the firm level and demand shocks
at the sector level.
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Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts 491
of Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2005), who emphasize a positive impact of openness (which
implies larger and more competitive markets) on the strength of the incentive mecha-
nisms, especially for the top managers or, in general, for the highest paid managers. We
also emphasize the possibility of an inverted U relation between the number of firms
and the absolute investment in cost reductions, which is in line with the evidence on
competition and innovation found by Aghion et al. (2005).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the general model with
multiple firms and a continuum of agents. Section 3 endogenizes the market structure.
Section 4 extends the basic model in other directions. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are
in the Appendix.
2. The Model
In this section we present a general model of Cournot competition with managers’
types independently drawn from a distribution function known by everybody. Consider
a market with inverse demand p = a − X, where X = ∑nj=1 xj is the total quantity
produced by n firms and a is a demand-size parameter. Production takes place at a
constant marginal cost which can be reduced by the manager: for simplicity, we assume
that effort e generates the marginal cost c − √e . Each firm hires a manager from a pool
of (ex ante undistinguished) managers to reduce the costs in a first stage and maximize
profits with the relevant market strategy (here the output level) in a second stage. In
the first stage, the contracts are chosen independently by all firms, but in the second
stage all the contracts and the cost-reducing activities become public knowledge and
competition occurs under perfect information.4
In the second stage, the output strategy of each firm i is chosen tomaximize profits:
πi =
(
a −
∑n
j=1 xj
)
xi − (c − √ei )xi − wi , (1)
where the investment (effort) of the manager ei and the wage wi have been already
decided and the cost structure is known to everybody.
In the first stage, the contract between each firm and its manager can establish the
size of the cost reduction, or equivalently the effort e, and the wage w.5 A contract (e, w)
determines the utility of the manager as:
Q4
u(w, e) = w − θe, (2)
4. More formally, contract offers are made simultaneously and realized costs become observable (but not
verifiable) by everybody at the end of the first stage. The complete timing of our game is as follows:
1.1. Nature draws the productivity of each manager;
1.2. All firms offer a menu of contracts (effort-wage schedules) to their managers;
1.3. Managers choose one of the contracts;
1.4. Efforts are undertaken and wages are paid;
1.5. Marginal costs become public.
2. Firms compete a` la Cournot in the product market.
5. We assume that the managers choose quantities to maximize profits in the interest of the firms’ owners
because this implies zero cost for them—we introduce quantity commitments directly in the contracts in a
later section. However, we maintain the assumption that contracts cannot be conditioned on the contracts of
the other firms or on final profits or prices. We are thankful to Jacques Cre´mer for a discussion on the last
point.
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where θ represents the marginal cost of effort. Our focus will be on the case in which the
productivities of the managers are different and uncorrelated, as realistic when there is
heterogeneity betweenmanagers or when firms are hit by independent shocks. Suppose
that each type θ is distributed on [θ1, θ2] ⊆ + according to a cumulative distributive
function F (θ ) that is assumed twice differentiable, with density f (θ ), and satisfying the
monotone hazard rate property for which h(θ ) ≡ F (θ )/ f (θ ) is increasing in θ .
First of all, note that the Cournot equilibrium of the last stage with n firms with
observable efforts e1, e2, . . . , en, implies the production of each firm:
xi =
a − c + n√ei −
∑
j =i
√
e j
n+ 1 , (3)
which generates profits πi = x2i − wi .
As a benchmark case, let us consider symmetric information between each firm
and its manager. This amounts to introduce uncertainty on the cost of the other firms
in the oligopolistic competition. We can think of each firm i choosing a map of con-
tracts (ei (θ ), wi (θ )), with (e, w) :[θ1, θ2] → 2+, that maximizes expected profits under a
participation constraint for the manager, that is, wi (θ ) = θei (θ ). Therefore, the optimal
contracts (ei (θ ), θei (θ )) maximize:
E(πi ) = Eθ
⎛
⎜⎝a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) −
∑
j =i
√
e j (θ j )
n+ 1
⎞
⎟⎠
2
− θei (θ ), (4)
where the expectation Eθ (·) of the gross profits is conditional on the type θ of the internal
manager and it is taken over the types θ j of all the managers of the other firms j = i .
The maps of contracts of these firms (e j (θ ), w j (θ )) are taken as given.6 The first-order
conditions with respect to ei (θ ) are:
Eθ
⎡
⎣n
(
a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) −∑ j =i √e j (θ j ))
(n+ 1)2
√
ei (θ )
⎤
⎦ = θ .
Since the manager’s type is known and the expectation is taken only over the types of
the rivals, that are uncorrelated, this can be rearranged as:
√
ei (θ ) =
n
(
a − c −∑ j =i E [√e j (θ j )])
(n+ 1)2θ − n2 , (5)
where the expectation is now an unconditional expectation over the others’ efforts. We
focus on parameter restrictions for which we have interior solutions for the effort levels,
which requires the assumption:
θ1 >
n2
(1 + n)2 . (6)
6. One could specify in more detail the conjectures on the contracts chosen by the competitors for their
managers. We avoid this because we will focus on symmetric equilibria. In general, this may lead one to
neglect other equilibria with the associated conjectures. Nevertheless, we believe that the symmetric equilibria
where all firms adopt the same effort and wage schedules are the most interesting.
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Taking the expectation over θ on both sides, we have:
E
[√
ei (θ )
] = a − c −
∑
j =i E
[√
e j (θ j )
]
n
· E
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣ 1(n+ 1
n
)2
θ − 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Solving out under the assumption of symmetry forwhich the firms adopt identical maps
of contracts (e∗(θ ), w∗(θ )), we obtain the average (square root of) effort:
E
[√
e∗(θ )
] = (a − c) S∗ (n)
n+ (n− 1)S∗ (n) with S
∗ (n) ≡
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)ds(
n+ 1
n
)2
s − 1
, (7)
where the function S∗(n) is increasing in n. Substituting in (5), we finally have the
equilibrium effort:
√
e∗(θ ) = a − c[(
n+ 1
n
)2
θ − 1
]
[n+ (n− 1)S∗ (n)]
, (8)
which is decreasing and convex in the manager’s type and depending on the number
of firms and on the entire distribution of θ . Note that for n = 1 we have the simple rule√
e∗(θ ) = (a − c)/(4θ − 1).
2.1 Oligopolistic Screening
Let us assume now that the managers have private information on their types and
contracts cannot be conditioned on them. After the contracts are signed, production
choices are taken under perfect information as before. Our focus is on the initial stage
in which contract choice takes place. Firm i chooses a map of contracts (ei (θ ), wi (θ )) to
solve a problem of maximization of the expected profits:
E(πi ) =
∫ θ2
θ1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣Eθ
⎛
⎜⎝a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) −
∑
j =i
√
e j (θ j )
n+ 1
⎞
⎟⎠
2
− wi (s)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ f (θ )dθ , (9)
under individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. The expectation
operator Eθ (·) is always taken over the types of the rivals, whose maps of contracts
(e j (θ j ), w j (θ j )) are taken as given.
As usual, the Revelation Principle (Dasgupta et al., 1979; Myerson, 1979) and the
incentive compatibility constraint require that the effort schedule must be nonincreas-
ing, ∂ei (θ )/∂θ ≤ 0 and that truth-telling is always optimal, ∂wi (θ )/∂θ = θ (∂ei (θ )/∂θ).7
Solving the last differential equation for the wage schedule, and using the fact that the
7. Indeed any type θ must find it optimal to reveal its true type θˆ = θ tomaximize the utilitywi (θˆ) − θei (θˆ),
whose first-order condition implies exactly the truth-telling condition in the text.
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individual rationality constraint must be binding on the least efficient type (wi (θ2) =
θ2ei (θ2)), we have the incentive compatibility constraint:
wi (θ ) = θei (θ ) +
∫ θ2
θ
ei (s)ds. (10)
Substituting this into (9) and integrating by parts, the optimal contract of firm i must
solve the following problem:
max
ei (θ)
∫ θ2
θ1
⎡
⎢⎢⎣Eθ
⎛
⎜⎝a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) −
∑
j =i
√
e j (θ j )
n+ 1
⎞
⎟⎠
2
− [θ + h(θ )] ei (θ )
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ d f.
The first-order condition for pointwise maximization can be rearranged as:
√
ei (θ ) =
n
(
a − c −
∑
j =i E
[√
e j (θ j )
])
(n+ 1)2 [θ + h(θ )] − n2 . (11)
Comparing this with its equivalent under symmetric information (5), one can verify
that the optimal contract is chosen by each firm according to the usual principles. In
particular, given the expectations on the contracts of the other firms E[
√
e j (θ j )], the
effort choice is downward distorted for all types except the most efficient. Neverthe-
less, strategic interactions will induce new changes in the optimal contracts chosen in
equilibrium.8
After imposing symmetry of the map of contracts (exploiting the absence of corre-
lation across types), we can derive the average effort:
E
[√
e(θ )
]
= (a − c) S (n)
n+ (n− 1)S (n) with S (n) ≡
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)ds(
n+ 1
n
)2
[s + h(s)] − 1
, (12)
where S(n) < S∗ (n) is increasing in the number of firms. Substituting in (11), we can
express the equilibrium effort function as follows:√
e(θ ) = a − c{(
n+ 1
n
)2
[θ + h(θ )] − 1
}
[n+ (n− 1)S (n)]
. (13)
This shows that, in general, the effort and the marginal cost do change with the type of
managers and induce asymmetries in the market.
Our explicit characterization of the equilibrium contracts allows us to determine
the equilibrium market structure, here summarized by the expected price:
E [p] = c + (a − c) [n− S(n)]
(n+ 1) [n+ (n− 1)S(n)] . (14)
We can describe the properties of the equilibrium under asymmetric information as
follows:
8. We are grateful to Patrick Rey for insightful discussions on this point.
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Proposition 1: Competition in contracts with multiple firms under asymmetric information
is characterized by a map of contracts(e(θ ), w(θ )) with efforts defined by (13) and decreasing in
the type of manager, and with wages defined by w(θ ) = θe(θ ) + ∫ θ2
θ
e(s)ds. The average effort is
reduced and the expected price is increased by the presence of asymmetric information between
firms and managers.
The equilibrium effort (13) depends not only on the type of manager, but also
on the entire distribution of types in a novel way through the S (n) function. Of
course, when n = 1 the optimal contract boils down to the traditional rule √e(θ ) =
(a − c) / [4 (θ + h(θ )) − 1] with the “no distortion at the top” property: the most produc-
tive type exerts the first best effort independently from the distribution of θ . However,
a deviation from this property emerges in equilibrium when there are more than one
firm. In particular, since h(θ1) = 0 but S(n) < S∗(n) we immediately derive from (13) and
(8) that e(θ1) > e∗(θ1): the most efficient managers are always required to exert more
effort than in “first best” when they are competing in the market. This result is driven
by commitment with substitutability between the strategies of the competing firms: cost
reduction in the first stage for the most efficient manager is greater than with sym-
metric information because of the reduced investment from less efficient competing
managers.9
The effort required from all the types different from the most efficient one must be
lower, but the comparisonwith the “first best” contract is nowmore complex. Moreover,
the number of firms affects in a substantial way the equilibrium contracts, creating a
complex interdependence between these and themarket structure.Multiplemechanisms
are atwork in influencing the impact of competition on the equilibrium contracts. First of
all, we have a price channel: an increase in the number of firms strengthens competition,
which tends to reduce the equilibrium price, which in turn leads to lower incentives to
exert effort. Second, we have a profitability channel: an increase in the number of firms
reduces the profits available to each firm, but it also increases themarginal profitability of
effort, especially formore efficient types. The net impact of the last two effects on effort is
positive and stronger for more efficient types—as can be seen from the term [(n+ 1)/n]2
at the denominator of (13). Finally, we have an indirect strategic channel: an increase in
the marginal profitability of effort for the other firms reduces the incentives to invest
in cost reduction—as can be seen from the term S(n) at the denominator of (13). The
net impact of these channels is ambiguous in general, but we can expect that a positive
impact of competition on effort could emerge only for the most efficient managers. The
next section verifies this and the other properties of the equilibrium.
2.2 Competition and Incentives
The following proposition describes the impact of competition, measured by entry of
firms, on the equilibrium contracts:
9. Other works have identified the optimality of effort provision above the first-best level for the most
productive managers due to strategic reasons within a principal–agent hierarchy, not between competing
hierarchies as here. In particular, an important work by Jeitschko and Mirman (2002) has analyzed a dynamic
principal–agent problem with noisy signals, showing that the principal may require an initial extra effort
(from a productive manager) to enhance the flow of information. In the presence of noisy signals, polarization
of the contracts is aimed at extracting better information on the type of manager for the future contracts
(as long as the mentioned mechanism prevails on the ratchet effect which requires increasing targets for the
good managers). This signalling mechanism within a vertical relation is clearly distinct from our strategic
mechanism in horizontal relations.
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Proposition 2: An increase in the number of firms: (1) increases the effort of all the most
productive types θ ∈ [θ1, θ˜ (n)), and decreases the effort of all types θ ∈ (θ˜ (n), θ2] for a cutoff
θ˜ (n) ∈ [θ1, θ2]; and (2) always increases effort differentials: given any types θp < θq , the ratio
between their equilibrium efforts e(θp)/e(θq ) is always finite and increasing in n.
This proposition tells us that the absolute effort levels may increase when the
number of firms goes up, but this can happen only for the most efficient types, whereas
the effort levels of the least efficient types always decreases with n. This is exactly what
can happen in a simple example with only two types (analyzed in detail by Cella and
Etro, 2010), in which a shift from monopoly to duopoly can increase effort only for
the most efficient types.10 More generally, when a new firm enters the market, all the
managers with productivity above a certain threshold (which depends on the number
of firms) are required to exert more effort, and the others end up exerting less effort.
Note that this is only a possibility result, in the sense that there may not be types more
efficient than θ˜(n) or it may be that θ˜ (n) < θ1, in which case effort is decreasing in the
number of firms for all types.11
In addition, the proposition has unambiguous implications for relative efforts,
which provides amore accurate description of the relative spending of firms on different
type of managers. It shows that effort differentials between more and less efficient
managers increase always with competition. For instance, considering two types θp and
θq with θp < θq , the equilibrium function (13) allows us to express the corresponding
effort differential as:√
e(θp)
e(θq )
= (n+ 1)
2 [
θq + h(θq )
]− n2
(n+ 1)2 [θp + h(θp)]− n2 , (15)
which is always increasing in the number of firms. The intuition of this result is driven
by commitment with substitutability between the strategies of the competing firms:
when the number of firms increases, each firm tends to differentiate more its contracts,
requiring a relatively higher effort from an efficient manager, because a commitment
of this kind leads to larger gains against less efficient rivals. In other words, each firm
spends a larger percentage of its revenues (or of its profits) in compensating efficient
managers rather than inefficient ones.As longaswe interpret this as the relevantmeasure
of the power of the incentive schemes, this framework shows that more competition
requires more high-powered incentive schemes. Our results may contribute to recover
a theoretical motivation for the weak but positive correlation between entry and the
strength of incentive mechanisms found in many empirical studies, for instance in
Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). In particular, and contrary
to the received literature, thepositive relationbetween thenumberof competitors and the
effort differentials across more and less productive managers can be seen as a rationale
for more aggressive incentive mechanisms in case of stronger competition.
Another message of Proposition 2 is that the effort differentials reach a maximum
level when we approach the perfectly competitive limit with infinite firms. In the case
10. This is in contrast with the negative relation between entry and cost-reducing activities which emerges
in the models of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Tandon (1984), Vives (2008), and others, where there is no
heterogeneity between firms.
11. As we will see below, for n large enough all effort levels must be decreasing in the number of firms.
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above, the limit is:
lim
n→∞
√
e(θp)
e(θq )
= θq + h(θq ) − 1
θp + h(θp) − 1 .
Of course, this does not tell us much about the absolute effort levels when the number of
firms is large and when it increases indefinitely. It turns out that the absolute efforts of
all typesmust decrease when the number of firms is large enough, and they all approach
the same limit when the number of firms tends to infinity. This is characterized in the
following proposition together with the associated market structure:
Proposition 3: When the number of firms tends to infinity, competition in contracts generates
zero effort for all types of managers, the price equals the maximum marginal cost, and profits are
zero.
This result should not be surprising: the incentives to invest for price-taking firms
depend on the size of their production (with or without asymmetric information), but
in the limit of a Cournot model all firms produce an infinitesimal output and those
incentivesmust vanish.At the competitive limit, there are neither informational rents nor
extra effort for any type of managers, and hence asymmetric information has no bite.12
From the last propositions we can draw the following conclusions on the impact of
competition (number of firms) on contracts. First andmost important, more competition
increases always the effort differentials between managers of different types. Second,
more competition can increase the absolute level of effort for themost efficient types, but
reduces it when the number of firms is large enough. Third, more competition reduces
the absolute effort of the least efficient types. All this suggests that a nonmonotone effort
function can arise for the most efficient types, and this can take an inverted U shape:13
with effort maximized for an intermediate degree of competition.
The numerical example of Figure 1 helps to visualize this pattern under a uniform
distribution. With such a distribution, F (θ ) = (θ − θ1)/(θ2 − θ1) and f (θ ) = (θ2 − θ1)−1.14
We assume a − c = 1, θ1 = 1, and θ2 = 10 and plot the equilibrium effort of the most
and least efficient types (respectively red vs. blue) for n ∈ [1, 20]. One can verify that in
correspondence of n = 1 we have no distortion on the top and downward distortion at
the bottom, the effort of the most productive manager is always above its equivalent
under symmetric information, and the effort of the least productive is always below.
Finally, an increase of the number of firms induces a reduction of the effort of the least
12. Puyet et al. (2008) already showed that under private values, equilibrium allocations in perfect com-
petition are all efficient with and without asymmetric information, arguing that unobserved inefficiency in
trade under asymetric information can only be attributed to imperfect competition. Our result reinforces their
findings.
13. We cannot exclude different, but still nonmonotonic, shapes of the relation between effort and number
of firms.
14. This implies:
S∗ (n) = n2 log
[
(n+ 1)2θ2/n2 − 1
]− log [(n+ 1)2θ1/n2 − 1]
(n+ 1)2 (θ2 − θ1)
,
which, combined with (8), provides the equilibrium effort under symmetric information in solid lines. Analo-
gously, we have:
S (n) = n2 log
[
(n+ 1)2(2θ2 − θ1)/n2 − 1
]− log [(n+ 1)2θ1/n2 − 1]
2(n+ 1)2 (θ2 − θ1)
,
which, combined with (13) provides the equilibrium effort under asymmetric information reported in dashed
lines.
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FIGURE 1. EFFORT UNDER (A)SYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITH SOLID
(DASHED) LINES
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FIGURE 2. EXPECTED PRICE (SOLID) AND AVERAGE UNITARY COST (DOTS)
productive managers and an inverted U shape for the equilibrium effort of the most
productive managers.
Therefore, the model can exhibit a bell-shaped relation between the number of
firms and the investment of the most productive firms in cost-reducing activities, in line
with the evidence on competition and innovation found by Aghion et al. (2005). Note
that such an outcome cannot emerge in case of homogenous firms, as recently shown by
Vives (2008) for a general class of models, but it emerges in the presence of heterogeneity
between firms. For completeness, in Figure 2 we also report the equilibrium expected
price and the average unitary cost (net of the cost reduction) for the case of asymmetric
information (assuming c = 0.1). The latter increases because the average effort decreases
with entry, but the former decreases with the number of firms because the direct impact
of competition is stronger than the indirect impact on the cost-reducing activities.
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2.3 Conditions for a Two-Way Distortion
The numerical example leads us to the general comparison of the equilibrium effort
emerging with and without informational asymmetry. However, the relation between
(13) and (8) is way more complex than in the case of a single principal–agent contract.
In fact, although both functions are decreasing in the type of the manager, the behavior
of their concavity is different in the presence of symmetric or asymmetric information.
Although the function
√
e∗(θ ) is always convex, the function
√
e(θ ) is not necessarily so
and its slope not necessarily larger in absolute value, meaning that multiple crossing
between the two functions may arise (whereas in the case of monopolistic screening the
two relations cross only once in correspondence of the most efficient type).
Nevertheless, introducing a stronger condition on the slope of the hazard rate
we can avoid multiple crossings and obtain a simple result: the no distortion of the
effort occurs for an intermediate type, with larger (lower) effort under asymmetric
information for all types above (below) that intermediate type.15 A comparison of (13)
and (8) shows that the intermediate type θˆ must satisfy the condition e(θˆ ) = e∗(θˆ), which
can be rewritten as:(
n+ 1
n
)2
h(θˆ)
(
n+ 1
n
)2
θˆ − 1
= (n− 1) [S
∗ (n) − S(n)]
n+ (n− 1)S (n) . (16)
Single crossing of the two effort functions requires that e(θ ) < e∗(θ ) for any θ > θˆ .
Developing this inequality from (13) and (8), we can rewrite the condition as follows:
(
n+ 1
n
)2
h(θ )
(
n+ 1
n
)2θ − 1
>
(n− 1) [S∗ (n) − S(n)]
n+ (n− 1)S (n) =
( n+1
n )
2h(θˆ
)
(
n+ 1
n
)2
θˆ − 1
,
where the last equality follows from (16). A sufficient condition for this is that the
function on the left-hand side is always increasing in θ . Deriving the left-hand side with
respect to θ , one can verify that this is equivalent to an additional assumption on the
slope of the hazard rate:
h′(θ ) >
(
n+ 1
n
)2
h(θ )
(
n+ 1
n
)2
θ − 1
. (17)
As long as the hazard rate is not only increasing, but increasing enough to satisfy
(17), we can be sure that asymmetric information increases the effort of all the best
managers and reduces the effort of all the worst managers with no distortion only for
the intermediate type θˆ . Although the above condition may appear rather demanding,
we can easily show that it is always satisfied by the uniform distribution. In such a case
15. A similar two-way distortion emerges in the model with one principal andmany agents by Lockwood
(2000) because of production externalities (the average effort increases the effectiveness of individual effort).
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h(θ ) = θ − θ1, therefore (17) reads as:
1 >
(
n+ 1
n
)2
(θ − θ1)(
n+ 1
n
)2
θ − 1
,
or (n+ 1)2 θ1/n2 − 1 > 0, which is always satisfied under our assumption (6).
Of course, condition (17) is sufficient but not necessary for a “two-way distor-
tion.”The next lemma derives the necessary and sufficient condition for such a “well-
behaved” case:
Lemma 1: Define the positive roots of (16) as θˆ1 < θˆ2 < .. < θˆz. Asymmetric information
increases the effort of all types θ ∈ (θ1, θˆ1) and decreases the effort of all types θ ∈ (θˆ1, min(θˆ2, θ2)).
Under the additional assumption:
h′(θˆ) >
(n− 1) [S∗ (n) − S(n)]
n+ (n− 1)S (n) for any θˆ , (18)
we have z = 1 (a single root).
Themathematical intuition for this lemma is simple. If the hazard rate is increasing
fast enough, the equilibrium effort function under asymmetric information decreases
significantly with the type so as to cross only once the equilibrium effort function under
symmetric information. Note that the condition corresponds to the simple monotone
hazard rate property (h′(θ ) > 0) in the baseline case of n = 1, but is more demanding
with multiple firms. As a consequence, we have:
Proposition 4: Under competition in contracts between nfirms, if and only if (18) holds,
asymmetric information increases (decreases) the effort of all the most (least) efficient types com-
pared to the equilibriumwith symmetric information, without distortion only for an intermediate
type θˆ ∈ (θ1, θ2) .
In otherwords, competition in contracts with asymmetric information delivers “no
distortion in the middle” and amplifies the differences between the efforts exerted by
managers of different productivities. In Figure 3 we exemplify this result for the case of
a uniform distribution with the same parameterization as above (a − c = 1, θ1 = 1, and
θ2 = 10) and n = 10. The solid line represents the equilibrium effort under symmetric
information, and the dashed line the one under asymmetric information, shown only
in the interval of the most efficient types with θ ∈ (1, 1.3). The most efficient type θ1 = 1
exerts effort
√
e∗(1)  0.3 in the former case and √e(1)  0.41 in the latter, while the
least efficient type θ2 = 10 exerts effort
√
e∗(10) = 0.009 under symmetric information
and
√
e(10) = 0.006 under asymmetric information. We have no distortion of effort only
for an intermediate type θˆ  1.1.
2.4 Endogenous Market Structures
In this section, we extend the model in a couple of directions aimed at provid-
ing a more realistic description of market competition. The first extension is to take
into account imperfect observability of the contracts at the competition stage. Main-
taining this assumption, we then endogenize the number of firms competing in the
market.
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FIGURE 3. THE FUNCTIONS
√
e∗(θ ) (SOLID LINE) AND
√
eθ (DASHED LINE)
One may think that the assumption of perfect information on contracts and costs
affects substantially the contracts signed at the initial stage. However, in our model this
is only a simplifying assumption without consequences on the nature of the equilibrium
contracts. To verify this aspect, let us consider the case of unobservable contracts and
costs at the time of competing in the market. In the last stage, all firms choose their
strategies taking as given the expected strategies of the other firms (rather than the
actual strategies), and, in the contractual stage, they choose the effort/wage schedules
to maximize their net profits in function of the expected equilibrium strategies. Under
our specification, we can show the following equivalence result:
Proposition 5: The equilibrium contracts with symmetric and asymmetric information do
not depend on whether these contracts are observable or not at the time of the competition in the
market.
Such an equivalence is due to the quadratic form of profits in our model. This
implies that the marginal profits are a linear function of the expected efforts and equal
to the expected marginal profits: as a consequence, firms adopt the same effort function
on the basis of the expectation either of their equilibrium strategies (when contracts are
observable) or of their average expected strategies (when contracts are not observable).16
Until now we have considered exogenous market structures in which the num-
ber of competitors was given. A more realistic situation emerges when entry requires
a preliminary fixed investment and the number of firms is endogenized through an
endogenous entry condition in the presence of a small entry cost. We now develop this
analysis, which provides a generalization of the endogenous market structure approach
of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Tandon (1984), Sutton (1991), and Vives (2008)17 to the
case of heterogeneity between firms and asymmetric information between their own-
ers and their managers engaged in (preliminary) cost-reducing activities. Our earlier
analysis with an exogenous market structure generated a positive correlation between
16. Of course, the ultimate equilibrium production levels differ depending on whether the contracts are
observable or not, but the initial contracts, the effort exerted bymanagers of different types in equilibrium and
even the expected production levels are not affected by contract observability, at least under our functional
form assumptions.
17. See Etro (2009) for a survey of the theory of endogenous market structures with applications.
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the number of firms and the relative effort levels, but it also suggested the possibility
of a negative correlation with the absolute effort levels, at least for low-productivity
managers and/or when the number of firms is high. As we will see, the first implication
holds true when we endogenize the market structure, but the second implication can be
questioned.
Let us focus on the last case examined, in which contracts are nonobservable.18 In
the initial stage entry occurs if nonnegative profits are expected, and, after that, the con-
tractual and competitive stages are the same as above. Under asymmetric information,
for a given n, the expected profits of each firm are given by:
E [πi (n)] =
∫ θ2
θ1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) − Eθ
[∑
j =i
√
e j (θ j )
]
n+ 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
2
− wi (θ )
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ f (θ )dθ .
Substituting the equilibrium efforts and wages we obtain:
E [π (n)] = (a − c)
2 Z(n)
[n+ (n− 1)S (n)]2 with Z(n) ≡
∫ θ2
θ1
[s + h(s)] f (s)ds(
n+ 1
n
)2
(s + h(s)) − 1
. (19)
This implies that, given afixed cost of entry K , the endogenousnumber of firms nˆ satisfies
E [π (nˆ)] = K and must be increasing in the relative size of the market (a − c) /√K . The
endogenous entry condition allows us to rewrite the equilibrium effort (13) as:
√
e(θ ) =
√
K
Z(nˆ)(
nˆ+ 1
nˆ
)2
[θ + h(θ )] − 1
, (20)
with average effort:
E
[√
e(θ )
]
= S(nˆ)
√
K
Z(nˆ)
.
As usual, the absolute effort of all types tends to zero when the fixed cost tends to zero.
An increase of demand measured by a (for instance associated with the process of
opening up to trade) or a reduction in fixed costs K are associatedwith an increase in the
number of players and, again, with an ambiguous impact on the absolute effort: on one
side this tends to increase because of the direct size effect, but on the other side it may
tend to decrease for the indirect impact due to the larger number of firms.19 In any case,
the size effect implies that the set of (most productive) types for which the absolute effort
increases is enlarged.Moreover, we can immediately derive an unambiguous conclusion
on the effort differentials:
18. Similar qualitative results emerge when the contracts are observable, but the analysis is more
complex.
19. Note that Tandon (1984) and Vives (2008) show that, in the absence of heterogeneity between firms
(and of asymmetric information), the size effect always dominates and effort increases with an increase in
the size of demand. However, their models of endogenous market structures differ from ours because they
assume simultaneous investment and production choices, while we assume sequential choices.
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Proposition 6: When the number of firms competing in contracts is endogenous, an increase
in the size of the market or a reduction in the fixed cost amplifies the effort differentials.
Therefore, our model is consistent with a positive relation between incentives and
number of competitors both in relative terms (effort differentials) and in absolute terms
for themost productivemanagers. These results appear in linewith the findings of Cun˜at
and Guadalupe (2005), who emphasize a positive impact of openness (which implies
larger and more competitive markets) on the strength of the incentive mechanisms,
especially for the top managers or, in general, for the highest paid managers.
Our analysis opens space for further investigations on the role of asymmetric
information in markets with endogenous structures. Etro (2011) has analyzed optimal
unilateral screening contracts in markets with endogenous entry, showing that a firm
would always gain from committing to aggressive incentive contracts (with extra effort
required from all types) to limit entry and gain market shares over the competitors.
Although that model, following the analysis of leadership with endogenous market
structures (as in Etro, 2006 orKova´cˇ et al., 2010), neglected contract competition, a similar
outcome is likely to emerge also in the present context. Finally, one could investigate
welfare analysis in our more complex environment.20
3. Extensions
Our general analysis can be employed to address a number of related applications.
Here, we focus on issues concerning product differentiation and different contractual
arrangements.
3.1 Product Differentiation
We can easily generalize the model to the case of product differentiation with imperfect
substitutability between goods. Assume an inverse demand function for firm i given
by pi = a − xi + b
∑
j =i x j , where b ∈ [0, 1] parameterizes substitutability. When b = 1
we are in the case of homogenous goods, when b = 0 we have independent monopolies
producing nonsubstitutable goods.
The Cournot equilibrium with n firms with efforts e1, e2, ... ,en, implies the produc-
tion of each firm:
xi =
(2 − b) (a − c) + [2 + b (n− 2)]√ei − b
∑
j =i
√
e j
(2 − b) [2 + b(n− 1)] .
Our methodology allows us to derive the equilibriummap of contracts under asymmet-
ric information with the following effort:
√
e(θ ) = (2 − b) (a − c){A(n) [θ + h(θ )] − 1} {[n+ (n− 1)S (n)] b + 2(1 − b)} , (21)
20. We should also mention an important work by Creane and Jeitschko (2009) that studies the role of
adverse selection for markets characterized by perfect or Cournot competition. It shows that the traditional
market failure due to informational asymmetries tends to vanish under endogenous entry and to be replaced
by limited entry with above-normal profits for the entrants.
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where
S (n) =
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)ds
A(n) [s + h(s)] − 1 and A(n) ≡
(2 − b)2 [2 + b(n− 1)]2
[2 + b(n− 2)]2 .
This equilibrium can be comparedwith the one emerging under symmetric information,
which allows us to obtain:
Proposition 7: As long as firms produce imperfect substitutable goods, equilibrium contracts
with asymmetric information are characterized by extra effort for the most efficient managers
compared to the equilibrium contracts with symmetric information.
Indeed, one can verify that independent goods (b = 0) lead to equilibrium contracts
that are identical to the optimal monopolistic contracts, with no distortion at the top, but
imperfect substitutability (0 < b < 1) leads to the same two-way distortion of the case
with homogenous goods, with extra effort for the most efficient types. Similar results
can be derived in case of price competition (see Cella and Etro, 2010), because the efforts
of the firms are still strategic substitutes.21
Finally, note that, given two types θp > θq , the equilibrium effort differential gen-
eralizes to:√
e(θp)
e(θq )
= A(n)
[
θq + h(θq )
]− 1
A(n)
[
θp + h(θp)
]− 1 , (22)
which is always increasing in the number of firms (except for b = 0) and also in the
substitutability parameter b: an increase in competition associated with more firms or
with higher substitutability between products is going to increase the effort differentials.
Therefore, our qualitative results on the relation between competition and both absolute
and relative efforts persist. Endogenizing the market structure we can derive again
a positive correlation between number of firms and effort differentials and, possibly,
also between number of firms and the absolute effort (at least for the most productive
managers).
3.2 Effort-Output Contracts
A precommitment on cost reduction before competing in the market generates a typical
tendency to overinvest in cost reductions to be more aggressive in the choice of output.
Although this effect was present in our model, it is important to remark that it did not
drive our qualitative results. To verify this, we now consider an alternative framework
in which principals can write contracts specifying both effort and market strategies for
their agents. Such an enlargement of the contractual options in the first stage allows
firms to reduce their initial investment, but has the cost of giving up to discretionary
strategies in the competition stage.22 As we will show, the availability of such contracts
21. However, this is not the case anymore when goods are complements, as with b negative here or in few
other cases inwhich efforts are strategic complements (for instance,wheneffort is exerted ingeneral advertising
for the market). In these cases equilibrium contracts distort downward all the effort levels compared to the
symmetric information benchmark (see Cella and Etro, 2010).
22. Note that, even in this general specification of the contracts, we are still assuming some form of
contractual incompleteness. The reason is that the contracts of the other firms are observable but not verifiable,
therefore firms cannot write contracts contingent on the ex post realization of the contracts of the other firms
(neither on profits or prices). If such an unrealistic form of complete contingent contracts was allowed, we
would obtain more complex results. In the two-types-two-firm case we would have “no distortion at the top”
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does not change our main results: the two-way distortion and the positive link between
competition and effort differentials.
Reconsider themodel with homogenous goods. Under symmetric information, the
expected profits are:
E(πi ) = Eθ
(
a − c +
√
ei (θ ) − xi (θ ) −
∑
j =i x
j (θ j )
)
xi (θ ) − wi (θ ),
where the expectation is again conditional on the type θ of the internal manager and
it is taken over the types θ j of all the managers of the other firms j = i . The optimal
mechanism forfirm i is nowgivenbyamapof contracts (ei (θ ), xi (θ ), wi (θ ))with (e, x, w) :
[θ1, θ2]→ 3+, whichmaximizes expectedprofits under a participation constraintwi (θ ) =
θei (θ ). The optimality conditions are:
√
ei (θ ) = x
i (θ )
2θ
, (23)
xi (θ ) =
a − c +
√
ei (θ ) − E
[∑
j = j x
j (θ j )
]
2
. (24)
From the second condition we can derive the expected value of total output and, rear-
range the output of firm i with a manager of type θ as:
xi (θ ) =
a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) −
∑
j =i E
[√
e j (θ j )
]
n+ 1 . (25)
Substituting this in (23), and isolating
√
ei (θ ), we have:
√
ei (θ ) =
a − c −
∑
j =i E
[√
e j (θ j )
]
n
[
2(n+ 1)
n
θ − 1
] , (26)
whose expectation can be solved for the symmetric expected effort:
E
[√
e˜(θ )
]
= (a − c) S˜
∗ (n)
n+ (n− 1)S˜∗ (n) with S˜
∗ (n) ≡
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)ds
2(n+ 1)
n
s − 1
, (27)
where S˜∗ (n) can be shown to be smaller than S∗ (n). This implies that the average effort is
reduced when the firms can contractually commit to their market strategies. Of course,
the lower effort levels tend to reduce production and increase profits. The intuition for
these results relies on the fact that, under basic contract competition, firms tended to
invest too much to commit to a higher production in the market: since the managers
decided howmuch to produce without taking in consideration the impact on the rivals,
this led to excessive investment ex ante and excessive production ex post from the point
for an efficient manager who happens to meet an efficient rival, an upward distortion of effort for an efficient
manager who happens to meet an inefficient rival, and standard downward distortions of the effort for an
inefficient manager. Details are available from the authors.
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of view of the firms. Contrary to this, the effort-output contracts allow firms to soften
competition.
The final equilibrium effort can be derived substituting (27) in (26):√
e˜∗(θ ) = a − c[
2(n+ 1)
n
θ − 1
] [
n+ (n− 1)S˜∗ (n)] . (28)
The introduction of asymmetric information determines the same qualitative re-
sults of our basic model. The first-order conditions for the optimal contract of firm i
under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility contracts are:
√
ei (θ ) = x
i (θ )
2 [θ + h(θ )] , (29)
and (25). The usual analysis allows us to derive the equilibrium effort as:√
e˜(θ ) = a − c[
2(n+ 1)
n
(θ + h(θ )) − 1
] [
n+ (n− 1)S˜ (n)] , (30)
where we defined:
S˜ (n) ≡
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)
2(n+ 1)
n
(s + h(s)) − 1
ds < S˜∗ (n) .
A comparison of (28) and (30) leads to conclude with:
Proposition 8: Under contractual commitment on the production schedules, asymmetric
information induces extra effort for the most efficient managers compared to the equilibrium
with symmetric information and reduces the average effort compared to the case without such a
contractual commitment.
All the qualitative results of the previous sections hold also in this case with
immediate adaptations. In particular, given any two types θp > θq , the effort differential:
√
e(θp)
e(θq )
= 2(n+ 1)
[
θq + h(θq )
]− n
2(n+ 1) [θp + h(θp)]− n , (31)
is still increasing in the number of firms. Moreover, one can verify that the effort differ-
ential for a given number of firms is higher compared to the baseline model. Also the
extension to product differentiation confirms the same results as above. Finally, since
effort-output contracts soften competition, the case of endogenous market structures
may lead to a larger number of firms compared to the baseline case. Nevertheless, it is
important to remind that welfare comparisons are not straightforward in this context
because equilibria are typically characterized by a suboptimal number of firms engaged
in suboptimal investments and production activities.
4. Conclusions
In this paperwe have analyzed competition between firms in the choice of incentive con-
tracts for theirmanagers.We have shown that in an equilibriumwith perfect information
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for each firm on its manager’s productivity, contract competition tends to increase the
effort of the efficient managers and to decrease that of the inefficient managers. With
asymmetric information, the equilibrium screening contracts are typically characterized
by no distortion in the middle, with efficient managers providing extra effort and with
an additional downward distortion on the effort of the inefficient managers. In both
cases, the relative effort required from an efficient type increases when the number of
firms increases, but all absolute effort levels converge to zero when approaching the
perfectly competitive limit. We also considered the case of endogenous market struc-
tures: in general, a larger market increases the effort differentials and tends to increase
also the absolute investments of the most efficient firms. This implies that a positive
correlation between the number of firms (as a proxy of competition) and the strength of
the incentive schemes is perfectly consistent with standard principal-agent theory.
As shown in Cella and Etro (2010), our analysis applies to other related models, in-
cluding those based on price competition and spatial competition. Future research could
investigate other applications of this form of contract competition and the impact of ex-
ogenous shocks, for instance a mean-preserving spread on the distribution of the types,
a change in the number of consumers of the market or other structural shocks. Another
direction for future research may focus on type-dependent participation constraints,23
a case in which the “no distortion at the top” property can fail also in a single-firm
environment, and on competition between managers and between firms to hire the best
managers. Finally, it would be important to verify the positive predictions of the model
on the empirical side.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Deriving (13) with respect to θ and using the monotone hazard
Q5
rate property it follows that effort decreases in the type for any n , which confirms that
the neglected constraint ∂ei (θ )/∂θ ≤ 0was nonbinding. Since S(n) ≤ S∗(n), a comparison
of the weighted average efforts in (7) and (12) shows that E[
√
e(θ )] < E[
√
e∗(θ )] . The
expected total production is E[X] = {a − c + E[√e(θ )]}n/(n+ 1) , therefore, the price is
given by:
E [p] =
a + nc − nE
[√
e(θ )
]
n+ 1 ,
which provides the expression in the text after substituting for the average effort. Since
the latter decreases with asymmetric information, the expected price must increase. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Deriving (13) with respect to nwe obtain:
∂
√
e(θ )
∂n
∝ 1 + S(n) + (n− 1)S′(n) − [θ + h(θ )]
(
1 + 1
n
)
·
·
[
n− 1
n
(1 + S(n)) + 2S(n)
n2
+ n
2 − 1
n
S′(n)
]
,
23. See, for instance, Laffont and Martimort (2002, chapter 3.3), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), and
Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000).
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which is decreasing in θ and positive only for values of θ close enough to its lower limit
n2/(1 + n)2 . Therefore, if the effort of some types increases with the number of firms,
it must be for any type θ ∈ [θ1, θ˜ (n)) where the cutoff θ˜ (n) is such that ∂
√
e(θ˜ )/∂n = 0 .
Finally, from the equilibrium efforts for types θp < θqone can derive:√
e(θp)
e(θq )
= (n+ 1)
2 [
θq + h
(
θq
)]− n2
(n+ 1)2 [θp + h (θp)]− n2 ,
which is greater than one (because the virtual type is increasing in θ under themonotone
hazard rate property) and it is increasing in n since:
∂
√
e(θp)/e(θq )
∂n
= (n+ 1)
[
θq + h(θq ) − θp − h(θp)
]
n3
[
(n+ 1)2 [θp + h(θp)]− n2]2 > 0.
Its upper limit is:
lim
n→∞
√
e(θp)
e(θq )
= θq + h(θq ) − 1
θp + h(θp) − 1 ,
which is alwaysfinite. Toverify this, note that the ratio betweenmaximumandminimum
effort tends to:√
e(θ1)/e(θ2) = θ2 + 1/ f (θ2) − 1
θ1 − 1 ,
since F (θ1) = 1 − F (θ2) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. First of all, note that:
lim
n→∞ S (n) = limn→∞
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)(
1 + 1
n
)2
(s + h(s)) − 1
ds =
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)ds
s + h(s) − 1 > 0,
which also shows that limn→∞ S (n) /n = 0. This implies:
lim
n→∞
√
e(θ ) = lim
n→∞
a − c
n
{(
1 + 1
n
)2
[θ + h(θ )] − 1
}[
1 + S (n) − S(n)
n
] = 0,
for any θ . Zero effort by all firms implies an equilibrium independent from the type
of managers with a limit price limn→∞ p = c. This trivially implies zero profits for all
firms. 
Proof of Lemma 1. First of all, note that under our assumptions, the functions (13) and
(8) are both continuous and decreasing on [θ1, θ2]. Since S (n) ≤ S∗ (n) and F (θ1) = 0, we
know that asymmetric information increases the effort required from the most efficient
type: e(θ1) > e∗(θ1) . Moreover, since E
[√
e(θ )
]
< E
[√
e∗(θ )
]
from Proposition 1, conti-
nuity of the two equilibrium effort functions imply that they must cross at least once—
otherwise effort would always be larger under asymmetric information, which would
jems12021 wiley3g-jems.cls May 18, 2013 22:0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts 509
be a contradiction. Any common point of the two functions must satisfy e(θ ) = e∗(θ ) .
Using (13) and (8), this provides:
(1 + 1/n)2
[
θ + F (θ)f (θ)
]
− 1
(1 + 1/n)2θ − 1 =
n+ (n− 1)S∗ (n)
n+ (n− 1)S (n) . (A1)
Define θˆi as the positive roots of this equation with θ1 < θˆ1 < θˆ2 < ..θˆz. It im-
mediately follows that asymmetric information increases the effort of all types θ ∈
(θ1, θˆ1) and θ ∈ (θˆ j , min(θˆ j+1, θ2)) with j even, and decreases the effort of all types
θ ∈ (θˆ j , min(θˆ j+1, θ2)) with j odd.
We now verify the condition under which the two functions cross only once. The
right-hand side of (A1) does not depend on θ . The left-hand side is equal to 1 for θ = θ1,
and its slope is proportional to:
h′(θ ) − h(θ )(1 + 1/n)
2
(1 + 1/n)2θ − 1 .
We can rewrite (A1) as:
(1 + 1/n)2h(θ )
(1 + 1/n)2θ − 1 =
(n− 1) [S∗ (n) − S(n)]
[n+ (n− 1)S (n)] > 0.
Using this, the slope of the left-hand side of (A1) is positive if:
h′(θ ) >
(1 + 1/n)2h(θ )
(1 + 1/n)2θ − 1 =
(n− 1) [S∗ (n) − S(n)]
[n+ (n− 1)S (n)] . (A2)
If this condition is satisfied for any θˆ , wemust have a single root for (A1) and asymmetric
information increases the effort of all types θ ∈ (θ1, θˆ1) anddecreases the effort of all types
θ ∈ (θˆ1, θ2). If the condition is not satisfied for one θˆ wemust have at least double crossing
between the effort functions. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Immediate from Lemma 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5. In case of unobservable contracts and costs, at the market competi-
tion stage all firms choose their strategies taking as given the expected strategies of the
other firms. The first-order conditions for firms j = 1, 2, .., n, given by:
xj = a − c + √e j − Eθ [X],
provide the expected total production:
Eθ [X] =
n(a − c) + Eθ
[∑n
j=1
√
e j
]
n+ 1 .
This allows us to rewrite the equilibrium production of each firm as:
xi =
a − c + n√ei − Eθ
[∑
j =i
√
e j
]
n+ 1 ,
which generates expected profits πi = x2i − wi .
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At the contractual stage, under symmetric information, firm i chooses a map of
contracts to maximize for each type θ the following net profits:
πi =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) − Eθ
[∑
j =i
√
e j (θ j )
]
n+ 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
2
− wi ,
where the expectations of the effort functions are taken over the types of all the other
firms, whose contracts are considered as given. Subject to the constraint wi = θei (θ ), the
profitmaximizing conditions are exactly the same as in (5), which under symmetry leads
to the same equilibrium contracts as in (8).
At the contractual stage, under asymmetric information, the net expected profits
of firm i are:
E(πi ) =
∫ θ2
θ1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
a − c + n
√
ei (θ ) − Eθ
[∑
j =i
√
e j (θ j )
]
n+ 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
2
− wi (θ )
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ f (θ )dθ ,
and the optimality conditions correspond to (11), leading again to the same equilibrium
contracts (13) as before. 
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is immediate since, according to Proposition 2, the effort
differentials are increasing in n , and (20) implies for any two types θp and θq with
θp > θq , the following effort differential:√
e(θp)
e(θq )
= (nˆ+ 1)
2 [
θq + h(θq )
]− nˆ2
(nˆ+ 1)2 [θp + h(θp)]− nˆ2 ,
where the endogenous number of firms nˆ is decreasing in (a − c) /√K . Accordingly, the
effort differential is increasing in (a − c) /√K .

Proof of Proposition 7. First of all, under symmetric information, the model generates the
equilibrium effort:
√
e∗(θ ) = (2 − b) (a − c)
[A(n)θ − 1] {[n+ (n− 1)S∗ (n)] b + 2(1 − b)}
with S∗ (n) =
∫ θ2
θ1
f (s)ds
A(n)s − 1 .
Now, assume θ1 + h(θ1) > A(n)−1 to insure the existence of an interior equilibrium under
both symmetric and asymmetric information. Deriving A(n) one can verify that:
A′(n) = −2b2 (2 − b)2
[
2 + b(n− 1)
2 + b(n− 2)
]
< 0,
for any b. Therefore, it follows that S(n) and S∗(n) are increasing in the number of firms
for any b and S (n) ≤ S∗ (n) for any b. Accordingly, we can compare the equilibrium
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effort with and without asymmetric information for the most efficient type, for which
h(θ1) = 0. For any b > 0 we have:√
e(θ1) = (2 − b)(a − c)[A(n)θ1 − 1]{[n+ (n− 1)S(n)]b + 2(1 − b)}
≥
√
e∗(θ1) = (2 − b)(a − c)[A(n)θ1 − 1]{[n+ (n− 1)S∗(n)]b + 2(1 − b)} ,
since both denominators are increasing in, respectively, S (n) and S∗ (n) but S∗ (n) ≥ S(n)
. For b = 0, we have A(n) =4 for any n and:√
e(θ1) = a − c4θ1 − 1 =
√
e∗(θ1),
as under a monopoly, therefore this is the case in which asymmetric information in-
duces the same effort for the most efficient managers compared to the equilibrium with
symmetric information.

Proof of Proposition 8. The proof of the first part is equivalent to the proof in Proposition
2. The average effort can be derived from (30) as:
E
[√
e˜(θ )
]
= (a − c) S˜ (n)
n+ (n− 1)S˜ (n) ,
which differs from (12) only for S˜ (n) replacing S (n). To verify that effort-output contracts
reduce the average effort, it is enough to check that S˜ (n) is smaller than S (n), but since:
2(n+ 1)
n
>
(n+ 1)2
n2
⇔ n > 1,
this is immediate for any n by direct comparison. 
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